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ABSTRACT
The family seems to pose an insoluble dilemma for a liberal society,
because it pits liberal values offreedom and equality against each other.
When family life privileges adult freedom, children's life chances become
unequal due to their parents' different choices and unequal circumstances.
But any effort to enact equality ofopportunity for children, it seems, would
demand such heavy-handed state regulation ofthe family that it would end
family life as we know it.
This is an old problem, and theorists who have grappled with it have
found themselves caught between two unappealing alternatives: rampant
inequality for children, on the one hand, and Brave New World-style
institutionalized child rearing, on the other.
This Article revisits the liberal dilemma and suggests that one
plausible version of liberalism can, at least in principle, combine wide
diversity andfreedom in family life with equal opportunity for children. But
this conclusion arrives with two caveats. First, the theoretical compatibility
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of the family and equality of opportunity rests on three interpretations
which remain contested even within liberal theory: the scope ofparental
autonomy, the meaning of equality of opportunity, and the functions
ascribed to the liberal family. Second, the legal changes necessary to
reconcile the family with equality would face practical and political
difficulties. An egalitarian regime would require new redistributive
programs and tax increases to fund them. A commitment to children's
equality would also require revision of constitutional and state law
doctrines that prize parental authority andfamily economic selfsufJiciency
and disclaim positive obligations ofthe state toward children.
The aims of this Article are primarily descriptive rather than
prescriptive. The analysis here identifies strands within liberal political
theory that can reconcile the liberal values offreedom and equality of
opportunity, but it does not attempt to persuade readers either that
liberalism is preferable to other normative views or that this particular
interpretation of liberal ideals should dominate other interpretations. Nor
does the Article attempt to offer a practical political program. Outside the
United States, legal principles and initiatives such as those developed here
might seem familiar. In the Us. context, however, these reforms would
require a thorough revision in legal institutions and in legal principles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Egalitarian liberalism aspires to equality of opportunity and despairs
of achieving it. "[F]air equality of opportunity," to use John Rawls's term, I
is central to the liberal vision: ideally, social and economic institutions
should ensure that every individual has an equal chance to live a life of her
own choosing. A society that offers the conditions of autonomy to some but
not to all has failed to deliver on the liberal promise of equal respect.
But the family, theorists have concluded, subverts the liberal
aspiration to equal opportunity.2 Children reared in unequal conditions
grow up unequally prepared for life. Poor children start life one step
behind: reared with inadequate food, shelter, health care, and education,
many face a meager set of life options compared to those open to richer
children.3 Even within the ranks of the middle class, family inequalities
1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73 (1971).
2. See id. at 73-74.
3. For an overview, see, for example, the essays collected in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP
POOR (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997) (investigating the effects of childhood
poverty on health, education, employment, and other outcomes).
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shape children's life chances. The child of college professors may gain a
head start on intellectual pursuits, while the child of a tennis ace or auto
mechanic may have an advantage in athletics or engineering. Parents' tastes
and talents shape family life and, with it, children's own talents and
aspirations.
Despite the family's shortcomings from an egalitarian point of view,
alternative institutions for child rearing strike us as horrendous. To
standardize children's experiences, the state would have to separate
children from their parents at birth and rear them in large-scale facilities.
One's immediate associations with such strategies are not promising, to put
it mildly. Plato's Republic advocates communal child rearing (for some
children) to support a hierarchy with elite philosophers at the top.4 Aldous
Huxley's Brave New World deploys communal nurseries along with
genetic selection and behavioral conditioning to demonstrate how a fascist
dystopia might perpetuate its class system.5 To be sure, a liberal approach
could reject Plato's caste structure and Huxley's behavioral conditioning.
Still, any form of standardized child rearing would seem to preclude family
life as we know it: the family would no longer be a cherished sphere for
adults to rear their children as they choose.6
Thus, the family seems to pose an insoluble dilemma for liberalism.
The liberal vision seems to collapse into itself, with freedom for adults
pitted against equality for children. Unless the state can achieve equality of
opportunity for each new generation, the liberal promise of equality rings
hollow. But equality seems to demand a heavy-handed interference in
family life that could be cruel to children and certainly would deny to
parents a cherished sphere for the exercise of personal freedom.
This Article reconsiders this classic problem and suggests that one
plausible version of liberalism can, at least in principle, combine diversity
and freedom in family life with equal opportunity for children. A liberal
state might recognize that a diverse array offamilies can all meet children's
two basic needs: emotional intimacy that cannot be accomplished in a
large-scale setting and the experience of living in a family that has chosen
its values and its way of life. On this interpretation, the state would not
4. See PLATO, THE REpUBLIC 109-10, 154-69 (G.R.F. Ferarri ed., Tom Griffith trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
5. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 20-32 (1932).
6. Fishkin notes the analogy to Plato and to Huxley and concludes that "[a]nything short of such
a large-scale alternative to the autonomous nuclear family would probably provide only an imperfect
barrier between the inequalities of the parental generation and the developmental processes affecting its
children." JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 64-65 (1983).
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attempt to standardize child-rearing conditions or to offer each child
precisely the same set of life options. Instead, an egalitarian liberal state
would seek to secure each child's material well-being and to ensure that
each family can meet its child's emotional and material needs. For their
part, parents would understand their role as one of obligation as well as
liberty: state constraints on parents (to consent to medical care, to send
their children to school, and the like) would be construed as part of the
liberal polity's collective obligations to children rather than as an
infringement on parents' liberty to treat their children in any way they
choose.
But the happy conclusion that the family can coexist peacefully with
equal opportunity arrives with two caveats. First, the theoretical
compatibility of the family and equality of opportunity rests on
interpretations of liberal ideals which remain contested even within liberal
theory: the meaning of equality of opportunity, the scope of parental
autonomy, and the functions ascribed to the liberal family. This Article
draws on two different strands of liberal theory-one addressing the nature
of disability7 and the other considering the claims of children on a liberal
polity8-to demonstrate that, in principle, equality for children can coexist
with liberty for parents. But, even within liberalism, these theoretical
moves are not universally accepted. Thus, one aim of this Article is to show
how the tension between equality and the family resurfaces if one adopts
alternative liberal interpretations of equal opportunity, parental autonomy,
or the functions of the family in liberal society.
The second caveat is that the legal changes necessary to reconcile the
family with equality would face practical and political difficulties.
Programs to equalize the material conditions of childhood would require
significant financial redistribution and new administrative structures and
would challenge the notion of family economic self-sufficiency. To ensure
equal material provision for children, an egalitarian state would require
transfer programs sufficient to attenuate the link between parents' financial
circumstances and children's access to food, shelter, health care, and
education. In addition, an egalitarian program would require supports for
parental care, such as an enriched educational program that would include
extracurricular activities, as well as institutions like paid family leave,
parent counseling, substance-abuse rehabilitation, and other support
servIces.
7. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LiBERAL STATE 120-38 (1980); PHILIPPE
V AN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL 72-82 (1995).
8. See infra text accompanying note 31.
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In addition, liberal equality for children would require a sea change in
U.S. constitutional law and state family law, both of which privilege
parental rights and disclaim any affirmative state obligation to secure
children's well-being. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
Constitution to endow parents with nearly unfettered freedom to control
children's lives.9 Similarly, state family law tends to privilege parental
freedom over children's interests. lO An egalitarian regime would face the
task of wrenching these legal interpretations in a new direction to
emphasize the obligations of parents (as well as their rights) and recast the
state as having affirmative obligations to support children and to assist their
families. Along the way, the demise of strong parental rights would reopen
a host of hard problems. Reconceptualizing the role of the state in
children's development would implicate issues including the First
Amendment, separation ofpowers, and federalism.
It is important not to overstate the practical hurdles facing an
egalitarian agenda for the family. Redistribution and constitutional change
seem less alien than Plato's (sincere) or Huxley's (dystopian) proposals.
Indeed, outside the United States, initiatives such as these might seem
relatively familiar, though perhaps not on the scale necessary to achieve
true equality. Nevertheless, in the U.S. context, these reforms would
require significant legal change.
Thus, this Article continues my project of drawing out the legal
implications of liberal egalitarian political theory. I I The analysis here
grapples with a dilemma internal to liberalism and aims to outline one
solution to the tension between the family and equality-while also
showing how different interpretations of liberal ideals tend to reintroduce
the tension. This Article is thus descriptive rather than prescriptive: it does
not attempt to persuade readers either that liberalism is preferable to other
normative views or that this particular interpretation of liberal ideals should
dominate other interpretations.
The Article proceeds as follows. After presenting the liberal dilemma
in Part II, I describe the liberal ideals and legal innovations that could
reconcile the family with equal opportunity in Parts III through VI. I then
step back in Part VII to highlight the interpretive moves that permit the
9. See infra text accompanying notes 77-86.'
10. See. e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 2-3, 26-40 (2006).
II. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999); ANNE L.
ALSTOTT, No EXIT (2004); Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 469 (2007) [hereinafter Alstott, Equal Opportunity]; Anne L. Aistott, Work vs. Freedom: A
Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE LJ. 967 (1999).
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reconciliation of the family with equality and to show how the dilemma
reappears if one adopts alternative interpretations within the liberal
tradition.
II. THE LIBERAL DILEMMA
Egalitarian liberalism insists that equality and liberty can coexist. 12
The theory rejects the libertarian notion that individual freedom consists of
doing as one likes with minimal intervention by the state. Instead, it insists
on equal freedom for all, a vision that requires the state to distribute
resources equally among adults and to remain neutral as to individuals'
ideals of the good. Each person should be entitled to live a life of her own
choosing, provided that her actions are consistent with the institutions
necessary to ensure the same freedom to others.
But egalitarian liberalism seems resigned to a liberty-equality conflict
when it comes to the family. In liberal theory, the family appears as a
sphere of negative liberty, a protected realm for individual self-expression
through relationships. This vision coexists with the ideals of equality and
freedom as long as all of the family's members are adults. But the
introduction of children revives the liberty-equality conflict. Family life is
rife with inequalities that shape children's life prospects. Rich children
inherit wealth and class advantage, while poor children suffer ill health, bad
schools, and limited economic and social opportunities. Families also differ
in other characteristics that produce unequal life chances for children.
Parents' religious and social commitments and emotional and intellectual
capacities can all affect the course of children's development. These
differences have led liberal theorists to conclude that the aspiration to
equality for children inevitably conflicts with the ideal of parental liberty.13
A classic statement of the problem appears in James Fishkin's 1983
book, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family.14 Fishkin posits an
impossibility theorem; he aims to show that there is an insoluble conflict
among three principles of liberalism: family autonomy, equal life chances
12. See. e.g., RAWLS, supra note 1, at 250 (stating the first and second principles of justice);
ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 10-17 (outlining the principles of neutrality and equal respect). See also
ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note II, at 3-5 (arguing that the liberal tradition values liberty and
equality).
13. See. e.g., JEFFREY BWSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE ETHICS OF THE FAMILY 13-14
(1982) (noting that "the family as we know it is an obstacle to the complete realization of a basic
principle of social justice," equality of opportunity).
14. FISHKIN, supra note 6.
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for children, and the merit principle. 15 The ideal of family autonomy
Fishkin describes corresponds closely to an ideal I will term "parental
autonomy": the central idea is that the family is a protected sphere for
adults to live lives of their own choosing. On this view, the family's
function is to permit individual self-expression and self-determination, and
the state should not interfere with family practices except to prevent
"severe harm.,,16
The dilemma arises when children enter the picture. Children cannot
exercise reasoned choice among the lives they might wish to live. But
children live with parents or other adults who do exercise choice about how
to live their lives, and these choices may influence children's development,
shaping their future prospects without their consent. 17
The tension thus seems to pit freedom for adults against equality, in
the sense of equal opportunity, for children. Fishkin suggests that efforts to
equalize child-rearing conditions would infringe unacceptably on parental
prerogatives to structure family life: "Coercive interferences with the
family would be required if advantaged parents were to be prevented,
systematically, from passing on cognitive, affective, cultural, and social
advantages to their children.,,18 The worry is that family background
unfairly tends to send children toward predetermined positions in the social
hierarchy. 19
By tradition, liberal theory relies on two institutions external to the
family to address the equality-liberty dilemma: redistribution and
education. Programs to redistribute material resources promote equality by
ensuring that every child has adequate food, shelter, and medical care.
Public education is a second corrective for inequalities arising from
differences in family background. A liberal education ideally would
prepare children to choose among diverse visions of the good; such an
education should, among other things, foster the capacity to reason and
provide cultural opportunities that differ from the child's family
15. ld. at 4-6.
16. See id. at 35-43. He concludes that "[s]o long as no one is severely hanned, intimate
consensual relations [defined to include '[r]elations between adults and children in a given family']
should be immune from coercive interference." /d. at 42.
17. ld. at 30-35.
18. ld. at 64.
19. ld. at 30-35. Fishkin adds that the merit principle adds a third prong to fonn a "trilemma." If
jobs (or other social positions) were awarded without regard to merit, perhaps on a pro rata or lottery
basis, children's life chances would not be influenced by family circumstances, because one's
opportunities would not be wfunction of one's skills or background. ld. at 19-30.
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background.20
But these are incomplete remedies for family inequality, Fishkin
suggests.2l Even if the state could produce material equality, and even if
the public schools were models of liberal education, family differentials
remain a barrier to equal life chances. Families vary in class status and
parental attributes, including tastes and talents, emotional openness, and so
on, and these differences can leave children inadequately, and unequally,
prepared for adult life. Children in high-status families benefit from
parental skills and social networks. Children in well-functioning families,
who have their emotional, intellectual, and moral needs met, tend to have a
head start over those whose families are less functional. And children
whose parents help school their tastes and talents may have a head start in
certain pursuits. 22
Schools can mitigate these inequalities but cannot eliminate them, in
part because school performance depends on family involvement, so that
educational institutions may replicate rather than redress inequalities in
family competence. This intuition finds confirmation in the empirical
evidence, which documents that family background matters for children's
life chances.23 Additional redistribution of wealth and improvements in the
public schools could mitigate these disparities. But monetary redistribution
cannot eliminate the effects of differences in family environment.24
Sociological studies suggest pathways by which class inequality
affects school outcomes. For example, the sociologist Annette Lareau has
documented how middle-class children are groomed for achievement from
an early age.25 Lareau's study details how middle-class children gain from
20. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 150-67.
21. See FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 67-82 (concluding that "[c]onsiderable evidence has recently
accumulated that, while compensatory efforts can indeed improve the developmental opportunities
facing the least advantaged, any realistic efforts will not be substantial enough to alter the basic pattern
of conflict in the trilemma").
22. See ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS 5-6 (2003); infra text accompanying notes
23-32.
23. For a summary of empirical evidence on intergenerational mobility, see W. Steven Barnett &
Clive R. Belfield, Early Childhood Development and Social Mobility, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Fall
2006, at 73, 87-91; Emily Beller & Michael Hout, lntergenerational Social Mobility: The United States
in Comparative Perspective, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Fall 2006, at 19, 23-27. Children's genetic
endowments also help detennine their life options; I do not consider that aspect of endowment in this
paper. For one approach to the problem of justice in genetic endowments, see ACKERMAN, supra note
7, at 113-19.
24. SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN'S LIFE
CHANCES 2-3, 9-14 (1997).
25. LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS, supra note 22, at 5-6. See also ANNETTE LAREAU, HOME
ADVANTAGE I-II (2d ed. 2000) (documenting the different approaches to primary education taken by
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their families' superior economic resources as well as from a style of child
rearing that she terms "concerted cultivation." Middle-class parents
cultivate their children's abilities through after-school activities and
intensive verbal interactions with their children.26 They also model a sense
of entitlement in interacting with school personnel, athletic coaches, and
other authority figures. 27 This is not to say that the middle-class child-
rearing style is perfect, merely that it confers certain skills. On the
downside, Lareau finds that middle-class children tend to be dependent on
parents, competitive with siblings, and distanced from extended family.28
By contrast, working-class and poor children sometimes face
deprivation because their parents lack money and time, but they also
experience a more relaxed style of nurture, which Lareau calls the
"accomplishment of natural growth. ,,29 Lareau finds that poor and working-
class parents aim to provide a space for children to develop on their own.30
On average, these children experience less verbal interaction with their
parents, and they spend long stretches of time with minimal adult
supervision.3l Working-class and poor adults and their children, Lareau
finds, tend to be uncomfortable with middle-class authority figures, a
barrier that can hinder parents' ability to obtain educational help for their
children.32
Fishkin concludes that the problem of inequality is intractable. Even if
society were willing to sacrifice family privacy, efforts to equalize child-
rearing conditions would either be prohibitively expensive or trivial in their
effects.33 He suggests, in passing, that the only truly fair arrangement might
be a "massive system of collectivized child-rearing," although such a
system would require equally massive interference with the life plans of
parents who seek to share their lives with their children.34
On the traditional view, then, the liberal state faces a double bind: If it
protects individual liberty for parents, it dooms children to unequal life
chances. If the state promotes equality for children, it damages a protected
middle-class and working-class parents).
26. LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS, supra note 22, at I 10-11.
27. Id. at 124-27.
28. Seeid at 52-65, 241-45.
29. Id. at 32.
30. See id. at 2-3.
31. See id. at 140-46, I 59---{)0.
32. See, e.g., id. at 208-17 (recounting a case involving a working-class child with probable
learning disabilities).
33. FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 67-82.
34. Id. at 64-65.
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sphere of liberty for parents. The state, it seems, can be liberal or
egalitarian, but not both, when it comes to the treatment of children.
But this conclusion rests on two premises that are worth examining
more closely. One is that equal opportunity requires a substantial degree of
sameness in developmental conditions for children. The worry is that any
differentials in family life will translate into an uneven playing field when
children reach adulthood. A second implicit premise is that the family not
only is, but ought to be, a sphere of privacy where adults should have the
right to do as they like, including to rear their children in any way they like,
provided they do not damage them severely.
The next three parts draw on different strands of liberal egalitarian
political theory to suggest that, in theory at least, equality for children can
coexist with liberty for parents in the realm of family life.
III. WHAT DOES EQUALITY FOR CHILDREN REQUIRE?
For children no less than for adults, the central question is: what is
equality? While there are many ideals of liberal equality, here I focus on
the strand of liberalism that emphasizes equality of resources. It reflects the
proposition that individual liberty and equality are paramount values. To
make liberty meaningful for all, every human being should have a chance
to choose the life she wants to live. While one's choices are always
constrained, the idea of equality of resources is that scarcity should be
apportioned so that each person has a fair share of the resources available
for her generation.35
Because resource equality demands ex ante equality in the distribution
of resources, resource egalitarianism is construed as an ideal of equal
opportunity.36 Generally speaking, resource equality takes the position that
equal resources should be devoted to each person's life. I will not aim to
capture every detail here; instead, I will quickly sketch some core
commitments of resource equality and show how they can support a
conception of equality that can coexist peaceably with the inherent
35. On this view, resources are understood broadly to encompass one's genetic and bodily
endowment, as well as the external resources available to shape one's life.
36. For instance, I understand Fishkin's analysis to invoke resource equality when it construes
equal opportunity for children as "equal life chances." See FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 30-35. Some
writers in this tradition describe their ideal as "equality of opportunity," though others use the term
differently. Compare ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note II, at 1-5, 31-34 (identifying resource
egalitarianism with equal opportunity), with RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 86-92 (2000) (equating "equality of opportunity" with libertarianism, and
rejecting it).
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diversity and variability of family life.
The canonical examples of resource equality focus on the situation of
adults rather than that of children. On Ronald Dworkin's desert island or
Bruce Ackerman's spaceship, the task is to divide up resources among
adults who come to the situation with their capabilities and values already
set. Equal opportunity for children thus confronts a novel problem: what
kind ofupbringing offers each child the preparation she needs to step up to
her fair share of resources, at the threshold of adulthood, as a free and equal
citizen?
One view, which I take to be implicit in Fishkin's analysis, is that
children require exactly the same developmental conditions; any variability
in family background is problematic because it perpetuates inequalities.37
In what follows, I draw on two principles of resource equality to suggest
the contours of a different approach which rejects sameness of
developmental conditions in favor of a more complex account of equality
for children.
The first principle is that the equal moral worth of each individual and
her life plan requires that society's material resources be distributed strictly
equally among individuals. The familiar result is that each should receive
the same share of society's physical resources and know-how. (The major
exception is for people with disabilities, who should receive more than
their pro rata share.) Thus, to take a simple example, if society has one
hundred units of fungible resources and one hundred adults, each person
should receive one unit of resources. 38
The task of equal division among adults becomes complex when it
comes to internal resources, because human diversity defies equality-as-
sameness. Even in ideal conditions, people have different values, tastes,
and talents. These differences inevitably produce inequalities in market
earnings and in personal satisfaction. Some talents (say, the ability to do
brain surgery) are scarcer and more highly remunerated than others. Even
outside the market setting, a fortuitous match (or mismatch) in an
individual's talents and inclinations may confer happiness (or
unhappiness). The classic example compares two people who both love
music, but one is musically talented while the other is not. The talented
person derives pleasure from her aptitude, while the untalented person is
37. See FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 64 (concluding that "if equality of life chances is to be achieved
through processes consistent with the principle of merit, then conditions for the development of talents
and other qualifications must be equalized").
38. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 53-59; DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 66-71.
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inconsolable, taking no solace from her other capacities (for mathematics,
say).
The second principle addresses the distribution of talents. While
resource egalitarians have taken different views, one notable view within
the resource equality tradition is articulated by Ackerman, who offers a
principle of "undominated diversity." Ackerman's core claim is that
differences in talent, even substantial differences, are consistent with
equality of resources. 39 His theory reflects the liberal ideal of neutrality: for
the state to say that the musical person is superior to her peers would
require a nonneutral (and therefore impermissible) judgment about the
objective value ofmusic.4o The distinctive feature of undominated diversity
is that it rejects piecemeal comparison of individual capacities and instead
considers each person as a whole person.41 If a person has talents and
abilities that enable her to choose among and to live one or more ways of
life that other people would reasonably consider good, then the person has
received a fair-read equal-share ofintemal endowments.42
The theory of undominated diversity offers a rejoinder to resource
equality theories that treat inequality in the distribution of talents as
problematic. Rawls, and to some degree Dworkin, for instance, view
endowments of talent as morally arbitrary, and they anticipate that a fair
society would in some way redress such inequalities.43
By contrast, undominated diversity rejects equality of talents as a
criterion for just distribution.44 Ackerman's theory locates equality in each
person's capacity for reflection, choice, and action.45 Instead of prescribing
that each person be capable of pursuing the same options, the theory
highlights the importance of permitting each person to choose a life plan
informed by her tastes and talents taken together. The demands of equality
are met, on this view, if each adult receives an equal share of society's
external resources (including physical and technological resources),
combined with an endowment of internal capabilities sufficient to meet the
39. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 120-38 (developing the concept of undominated diversity).
See also VAN PARIJS, supra note 7, at 72-76 (adopting and extending Ackerman's view). Cf DWORKIN,
supra note 36, at 85-92 (suggesting institutions to compensate for differentials in marketable talents).
But see VAN PARIJS, supra note 7, at 68-72 (discussing deficiencies in Dworkin's view from the
perspective of resource equality); Alstott, Equal Opportunity, supra note II, at 481-82 (same).
40. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 123-24.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. RAWLS, supra note I, at 100-04; DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 85-92.
44. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 120-24.
45. See id.
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criterion ofundominated diversity.
These two principles of equality for adults--equal division of material
resources and the tolerance of wide differences in internal capabilities-
suggest two analogous premises about the distribution of resources among
children. First, fungible resources should be distributed equally. Because
each child has equal moral status, there is no reason for granting some
children superior access to material resources based on the accidents of
birth-that is, being born to parents with low or high earning capacity.46
Second, equality in the distribution of children's capabilities should not
require that each child develop--or even have the chance to develop-
precisely the same set of skills or capacities. Rather, the metric for equality
should be whether each child's developmental conditions will leave her at
the threshold of adulthood with a set of opportunities that meet the equality
criterion and the capacity to exercise judgment and bring values to bear in
the choice she makes.
I will call these two principles, taken together, an ideal of complex
equality. The aspiration to equality is obvious enough. I add the modifier
"complex" because I will shortly contrast the kind of family life admissible
under this ideal with the stricter and less attractive vision of family life that
would follow from an ideal of simple equality or equality-as-sameness.47
The distinction between external and internal resources seems robust
in the case of children. Begin with external resources: since children too
have equal moral status (at least with one another and with children across
generations), they should be entitled to an equal share of the external
resources (meaning material goods and technology) devoted to child
rearing. This principle would require substantial equalization in children's
housing, nutrition, and health care.48
A harder question is whether a liberal regime should attempt to deny
parents the benefit of housing, nutrition, and health care provided to their
children. Nothing in the baseline argument justifies the distribution of
additional resources of this type to parents: each adult has received her fair
share already (by supposition), and the fact of having children does not
(without further argument) merit an additional dip into the pool of social
46. One might pursue the equality-of-what question here and ask what the right metric for equal
division should be. Equal dollars per child? Equal access to nutrition, health care, and education?
47. For a discussion of the concept of simple equality, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 13-17 (1983).
48. Colin Macleod makes a similar point in an essay drawing on principles of luck egalitarianism
rather than resource equality. See Colin M. Macleod, Liberal Equality and the Affective Family, in THE
MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 212 (David Archard & Colin M. Macleod eds., 2002).
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resources. I have argued elsewhere that parental obligations are sufficiently
stringent and long lasting so that parents may merit additional resources,
but these (I suggest) should be of a type that would improve parents' long-
term options; I reject the idea that parents should have greater consumption
opportunities than other adults.49
This line of argument suggests that in an ideal setting (in which, inter
alia, the parents' generation has enjoyed equality of resources), the
provision of housing, nutrition, and health care to children should not
improve their parents' lots. But even in an ideal setting, the indivisibility of
at least the first two items in this list poses a practical problem. (Health care
is different, of course; it is substantially divisible among individuals.)
Parents and children share space and share food, and it is reasonable
(indeed, desirable on most moral views) for children to be taught to share
and to live in a regime of communal equality. The intimacy of family life
would be disrupted if children eat well while parents starve, or if children
live comfortably in rooms forbidden to parental access.
This suggests that to the extent resources for children are indivisible,
parents should be permitted to share them. This conclusion would increase
considerably the cost of providing equal material resources for children,
because each child's own resources should not be diluted based on the
number of adults she must share them with. (So, for example, a child with
two parents in the household should not receive less food than a child with
one, and indeed, such a family should probably receive more food to ensure
that the second parent does not consume part of the child's share.)
The practical complications raised by these ideas multiply rapidly. For
instance, what if parents who could provide food, shelter, and health care
for their children decline to do so because the state will? What if parents
stop buying food for themselves in order to eat on the state's budget-or
begin to cram into households with children in order to claim the free food?
What if parents abuse the state housing budget, choosing to lavish money
on (say) their own bedroom or bathroom while slighting the children's
space?
These represent three types of objections. Thp, first is that the state
may subsidize wealthy parents by providing equal support to rich and poor
children. This claim reflects a baseline of family self-support, according to
which parents should provide material support, and the state should step in
only when parents fail. If we shift to treating material support for children
49. ALSTorr, No EXIT, supra note 11, at 49-72.
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as a collective (state) obligation, richer parents are not enriched (relative to
the appropriate baseline of collective support).
The second and third cases represent a different abuse: indivisibility
may require some sharing, but it should not serve to enrich parents by
reducing their expenses for their own consumption. These would not be
simple problems to solve, although they are familiar ones. Targeting
mechanisms now used in social welfare and taxation address somewhat
similar issues: the attempt is to detect parents who claim to be impecunious
but who could afford to feed or house themselves. Still, one should not
underestimate the magnitude of the practical problem: detecting erstwhile
"parents" who are really freeloaders with no connection to the children
would require monitoring of the family unit to see whose connections to
the children are deep and lasting enough to merit the indivisibility benefit.
Detecting parental misappropriation of funds meant for children would also
require some monitoring device.
In principle, then, it seems that the state should guarantee children an
equal share of material resources, whether parents' actions reflect their
values (they do not wish to use their resources for their children) or their
financial status (they wish to, but cannot, provide adequate resources for
their children). A denial of medical care to a child, for instance, would
violate the ideal of equality whether it reflected the parent's religious
beliefs or parental poverty.50 As we shall see shortly, the liberal ideal of
child rearing would grant parents considerable leeway to share religious
beliefs and other commitments with their children, but the ideal would also
limit parental prerogatives in ways that current law does not. The standard
of equal material provision is the first of these limitations: it implies that no
child should fall beneath the baseline of state-provided resources, even if
her parents would prefer to decline medical care, nutrition, or shelter.
When it comes to internal resources, once again the development of
children's capacities seems to map onto the principles that govern the
distribution for adults. The equality-of-resources ideal would not require
the development of identical capabilities in every child. Rather, it suggests
that each child should develop the capacities needed to make reasoned
choices among ways of life. This implies that children should have the
50. The law in some states requires parents to provide life-saving medical care even when doing
so runs counter to their religious beliefs. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988)
(upholding prosecution of Christian Science mother for daughter's death of meningitis when mother
only provided treatment by prayer rather than medical care). But see Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d
775 (Fla. 1992) (overturning convictions of Christian Science parents for daughter's death from
complications related to diabetes for providing only spiritual treatment).
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cognitive, emotional, and moral capacity to identify and analyze different
value commitments. Each child should also gain some experience of the
practical satisfactions and frustrations of living a committed life, and she
should be offered the chance to explore ways of life outside those lived by
her parents.
Beyond these capabilities, which look to children's capacities to make
private choices, each child should also develop the capacity needed to
participate in the public life of an egalitarian society. The state and its
institutions ought ideally to provide equal opportunities not only to children
in this generation but to every individual in every future generation as well.
Otherwise, equality would be a one-generation phenomenon. Implicitly,
equality requires the persistence of the liberal state and its institutions.
Thus, individuals should not only be trained to make choices about their
own lives, but also to participate in a polity that requires tolerance of
others' choices and the deployment of resources to enable future
generations to live lives of their own choosing.51
In summary, then, an equal-opportunity state would mandate an equal
distribution of material resources among children as well as additional
institutions to foster cognition, emotional control, and moral discernment in
children. Ideally, children's education (using this term broadly) would
include experience of one committed way of life as well as exposure to
alternative values, and would include schooling in the values of tolerance
and equality embodied in the liberal state.
What institutions could best carry out these mandates? The family and
the schools represent major attempts to shape children's capabilities. In the
next part, I begin by asking whether the family should persist in an ideal
liberal egalitarian regime, and later I consider schools along with other
institutions that might attempt to enrich children's development.
IV. WHAT FUNCTIONS DOES THE FAMILY SERVE?
The family's role in child development has been little studied in some
of the canonical sources that layout the core principles of egalitarian
51. For example, David Archard has argued that a "liberal state must be reproduced and this
requires that it ensure its future citizens at least have the minimal capacities necessary to function as
participating citizens." David Archard, Children, Multiculturalism, and Education, in THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 48, at 142, 153. Ackerman's dialogic conception ofliberal
justice, which emphasizes each person's actual capacity to defend his or her way of life in the public
forum, leads him to identify communication and language development as important developmental
goals. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 143--46.
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liberalism.52 But a newer vein of scholarship reconsiders the liberal family
from the child's point of view. Drawing on this literature, we can begin to
see how the family serves several functions in a liberal system of child
rearing.
First, families foster children's emotional development by providing
continuous, intimate, and reliable care. The adults involved may be parents,
grandparents, or unrelated to the child, but whatever their identity, these
"parents" (defined in a functionalist sense) should persist in the child's care
for a long period in order to provide the foundation for emotional stability
and growth. Continuity of care fosters emotional development and also lays
the emotional foundations for intellectual and moral growth.53
Families also provide moral instruction to children and help create a
cultural identity. Parental authority and trustworthiness foster moral
learning, as parents continually instruct children directly and by example in
matters of morality.54 Families may also choose religious and cultural
institutions that convey moral messages and give the child a sense of a
cultural community with distinctive values and practices.55
In addition, families serve to immerse children in particular moral
practices and cultural traditions.56 Ackennan suggests that families
properly take responsibility for children's early nurture, providing
discipline and an introduction to social life and morality-and, in the
process, give children an early introduction to the family's chosen way of
life. Ackennan argues that the family satisfies children's "need for cultural
coherence"-a thick fonn of cultural identity which serves as the starting
point for children's exploration of other life options.57 "Family" in
Ackennan's theory is understood rather expansively, since cultural
coherence might, in principle, be established just as readily in a kibbutz or
other communal setting. But cultural coherence does anticipate that
families in whatever fonn will have deep attachments to particular ways of
life, and that children will, in their early years, incorporate these moral and
cultural traditions into their understanding of their own place in the world.
52. Both RAWLS, supra note I, and DWORKIN, supra note 36, devote very little attention to the
child-rearing family. But see RAWLS, supra note I, at 462-67 (considering the parent-child relationship
as the source for certain moral understandings).
53. For an account of continuity of care, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-39 (new ed. 1979).
54. See RAWLS, supra note I, at 462-67.
55. See Eamonn Callan, Autonomy, Child-Rearing, and Good Lives, in THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note 48, at 118, 133-36.
56. See id.
57. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 140-43.
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In Ackerman's theory, family nurture is properly balanced, as children
mature, by increasing exposure to other visions of the good.58 Still,
children's first experiences would inevitably differ, depending on their
parents' ways oflife.
In Ackerman's account, which dovetails to some degree with theories
offered by other liberals,59 the moral and cultural diversity associated with
families plays a positive role in children's development, provided that
children also receive guidance in considering alternatives to their family's
way of life. A deep exposure to one particular way of life and repeated
interactions with parents demonstrate firsthand how a committed life is
lived-and the sacrifices involved. Liberal institutions should help older
children discover alternatives and begin to expand their horizons.6o Family
influence may never be entirely erased by later education, so that children's
autonomy is limited relative to a baseline of unlimited options. But
theorists in this vein tend to prize cultural coherence over "rootlessness.,,6l
To make the point concrete, consider the problem of inequalities in
parental tastes and talents. Even in an ideal setting, parents will differ in
their ways of life, and these may give some children a leg up. Some parents
will fill their houses with music and encourage children to join in. Others
will love sports and get their children out on the playing field at an early
age. Some families will sit on the couch and watch television. The
existence of a liberal education system could mitigate these differences in
background (compared to the situation today) by offering a program of
extracurricular activities to all. Still, family traits would give some children
an advantage over others.
The criterion of complex equality suggests that these represent the
kind of immersion in a way of life that the liberal ideal of the family takes
as positive. The goal should not be (even if it were possible) to match every
child with the family that best develops her own talents. In a neutralist
liberal framework, it would be improper for the state to identify which of a
child's potential talents represent the highest or best. A collectivist society
may identify athletic ability or academic proficiency as talents to be
developed in children for the greater glory of the state; think of the former
Soviet bloc machinery designed to detect and train gymnasts from an early
age.
58. See id. at 146-54.
59. See Archard, supra note 51; Macleod, supra note 48.
60. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 15D-54.
61. See Archard, supra note 51, at 158.
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But in a liberal society, whether particular parents' traits "advantage"
a child depends on the child's own values as they ultimately develop.
Human nature and the mediation of a liberal education will ensure that
there is no guarantee that children come to endorse the values or traits with
which they have been reared. When children do endorse their families'
particular tastes as adults, and feel themselves to have been given a gift,
that endorsement reflects a considered choice on the child's part to assign
value to her upbringing rather than to reject it. In either case, the child has
been immersed in a particular way of life and has seen firsthand the
pleasures and strains associated with it.
On this view, the family's role is to give children the experience of a
committed life. If specific cultural experiences, talents, or tastes developed
in childhood tum out to be valuable to the child, this is because she has-
after a process of structured deliberation fostered by a liberal education-
chosen to adopt them as reflecting her own values. Within a wide range,
then, a pluralist liberal society might tolerate parental tastes and talents just
as it tolerates families' cultural attributes.
(Incidentally, this view implies new meanings for terms like "parent"
and "family." The family in this sense need not be defined by a biological
relationship between parent and child or by marriage (or a sexual
relationship) between parents. Instead, parents are those adults who provide
the child with continuous, intimate care, and who foster development of the
child's emotions, intellect, moral life, and cultural identity.)
To sum up, families uniquely perform two principal functions related
to child development. They foster emotional and intellectual development
via continuity of care, and they foster moral development and cultural
identity by living a committed way of life, with "commitment" understood
in a neutralist sense, so that the commitment might be to nothing in
particular.
Notable for its absence on this list is the conventional function of the
family as provider of financial support. The absence of this function begins
to suggest how controversial an egalitarian program might be in the present
U.S. context. Consistent with the discussion of equality for children above,
the family, in an ideal setting, would not be a primary provider of material
goods. u.S. families today take primary responsibility for procuring food,
clothing, shelter, and health care for their children. But parents' financial
capacities differ depending on their market earnings capability, their choice
of jobs, and their other life choices. The equality-of-resources ideal
suggests that, within certain bounds, adults' access to material resources
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should vary depending on the choices they make. Indeed, the insistence on
ex ante equality and the tolerance of ex post inequality represent hallmarks
of resource equality, which holds that adults are properly responsible for
the consequences of their values and choices.
But the same ideal suggests that society's tolerance of ex post
economic inequality should not extend to children, who remain in a state of
preparation and who-by reason of being children-cannot make
economic choices for which they are properly held responsible. Thus, an
egalitarian liberal state would attempt to engineer matters so that children
receive an equal share of developmental resources, as discussed above.
One might object that material equality for children could undermine
the emotional, cultural, and moral functions of the family. After all, many
people associate their own upbringing with money and, in particular,
constraints on money. Values and culture come into play when people
make decisions about how to deploy scarce resources: with the same
budget, one family may tithe, while another takes vacations, and a third
sends the money to a needy relative. Parental control over scarce resources
also provides an occasion for moral teaching: Do not steal or cheat, even if
you lack money for things you need. Give money to the less fortunate, even
if it means skipping a meal yourself. In many families, money takes on an
emotional dimension as well. Parents' decisions to spend money on a child
or to withhold it may be deeply involved with demonstrations of love,
demands for discipline, and attempts to build self-reliance.
One might suppose that connections between money and family would
still operate in a regime of equal material provision for children. They
would simply operate with less force. Even if the state paid 100 percent of
the costs of rearing children, scarcity would still exist. A typical family's
budget would be less constrained under such a system than it is today, but
the family would still face scarcity in the economist's sense of the term,
and there would still be tradeoffs to be made: Contribute more to the
church? Take more vacations? Reduce Dad's or Mom's working hours?
Move to a bigger house?
While it is true that all of these decisions would continue to be value-
laden, culturally situated, and drenched in emotion, the important point is
that families would no longer be distinguished by the degree of economic
desperation they face, or the degree of absolute deprivation their children
experience. Instead, spending decisions at the margin would reflect parental
values.
Could parents properly object that state-provided resources for
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children would infringe their autonomy by denying them the freedom to act
as financial providers? In the United States today, this may be one likely
reaction by many parents, because the parental role today is so closely
bound up with financial provision. When children's fortunes depend-as
they do, today, in the United States-on parental success in the
marketplace, it may seem that the "good" parents are the ones who do their
best to struggle and succeed in that marketplace. But the egalitarian agenda
suggested here would, in principle, sever the link between financial
providership and parenthood. Parenthood would instead be a matter of
providing nonfinancial resources: continuous care, moral instruction, and
cultural coherence. This change in the nature of parenthood could strike
U.S. readers as radical, and yet it probably strikes readers from more
egalitarian European societies as relatively familiar. In Part VI, below, I
suggest a principled rationale for treating this shift as an appropriate
reshaping of the boundaries of parental freedom, rather than an
impermissible infringement of parental liberty.
One outgrowth of this functional view of the family as an institution
devoted to child development is that it begins to suggest why institutional
child rearing would be undesirable in a liberal egalitarian regime. To be
sure, liberalism has at times flirted with collectivization. Fishkin suggests
in passing that a "massive system of collectivized child-rearing" might
serve the ideal of equality for children.62 It is worth pausing on that idea to
deepen the distinction between complex equality and equality-as-sameness.
What we shall see is that the impulse to standardization is misguided
because the family (understood to encompass diverse forms, as discussed
above) uniquely promotes the individual capabilities prized in a liberal
society.
Communal child rearing could in theory be adapted to fit liberal
criteria. Jeffrey Blustein points out that, instead of engineering
developmental conditions to reproduce a caste system, communal methods
might simply be used to ensure "uniform standards of competence [for
adults engaged in rearing children], so that there could be no difference
among children resulting from the differential abilities, intelligence, skills,
and emotional capacities of individual parents."63
62. FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 64-65. He argues that "if equality of life chances is to be achieved
through processes consistent with the principle of merit, then conditions for the development of talents
and other qualifications must be equalized." [d. at 64 (emphasis added). Fishkin does not endorse such
endeavors, since he aims to illustrate the collision between the liberal principles of equality of life
chances and family autonomy, and not to encourage the abandonment of family autonomy.
63. BLUSTEIN,supranote 13,at2l3-l4.
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The impulse toward standardized child rearing reflects a concern for
equality. The idea seems to be that, if the state could devise a fair and
humane system, it could avoid inequalities reflecting family differences.
The child-rearing system could be staffed with qualified professionals,
including nurses, teachers, social workers, doctors, and psychologists, for
instance. Thus, the problem of differential competence among parents
would subside. Class advantage would disappear as well, since these
professionals would all hail from the middle class and would use expert
methods and a standard developmental curriculum. Differences in parental
tastes and talents would disappear as well, since every child would have
access to a standard array of extracurricular enrichments: sports, music, and
art, for instance.
The practical failings of such a system are obvious; the experience
with public education illustrates the gaps between an ideal universal system
and a real one structured by politics. But, in keeping with my method to
this point, I want to suggest that a standardized system of child rearing
would be undesirable even in an ideal setting in which the institution
worked just as intended.
Begin with the illusion of sameness. Even heavily regulated, large-
scale institutions would not, in fact, produce the same developmental
conditions for children, whether measured by inputs (what children
experience) or by outputs (what capacities children develop). The diversity
of human beings means that even standardized developmental conditions
would inevitably differ, and these differences could advantage some
children over others. Even communal living conditions would inevitably
differ from institution to institution, because adults differ. One headmaster
(or teacher) might emphasize structured days full of reading, writing, and
chores, while another might be laid-back and permissive. One facility
might value its large soccer field while another tolerates a small, scruffy
playground in order to maintain an up-to-date gymnasium. Relatively small
differences could affect children's development. One child may thrive in
the highly-structured routine while the same regimen leaves another child
defiant and depressed. A child who loves tumbling but abhors team sports
will find her niche in the institution with the gym more readily than in the
one with the soccer field.
But even if diversity of experience could be purged from the system
(by, say, substituting child-rearing robots for human teachers and requiring
all facilities to adhere to a single physical layout, ala Wal-Mart), children's
own differences in temperament and intellect would lead to different
reactions to the same stimulus. Even robotic programming would display
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tendencies (to talk or to be silent, to be peppy and outgoing or quiet and
passive, to enforce rules or to encourage innovation by the children) that
would fit some children's needs better than others. There could be no
neutral program that would fit every child's psychological needs, so
children would emerge from the standard experience with very different
capabilities. Some children would learn to work the system, while others
would perceive themselves to be misfits, with positive or negative
consequences for adult achievement. A child-rearing system that
predictably advantaged (say) the outgoing over the introvert, the quick-
witted over the slower and more thoughtful, and the manipulative over the
straightforward would seem to violate any ideal of sameness.
At first, this conclusion seems to leave liberalism in a bind, because
families also advantage some children over others. Parents' temperaments
and ways of life may be well matched with those of their children, or
continually at odds. If a standardized system would advantage some
children and fail others, just as families do, then the liberal ideal of equality
seems unattainable, even in theory. Liberals might debate whether families
or a standardized regime would be better or worse, on balance, but both
would appear to create morally arbitrary advantages for some children over
others, depending on one kind of accident (the family to which one is born)
or another (the institution to which one is assigned and the fits of its people
and methods with one's temperament).
The mistake here is the tendency to interpret equal opportunity as
aspiring to sameness of life options. If one accepts the ideals of
undominated diversity and complex equality as I have presented them,
sameness is not a core value. Liberalism seeks to recognize the moral worth
of each individual, to make possible a variety of ways of life, and to remain
neutral toward the whole range of lives that individuals might choose to
live. Taking these values seriously, we can begin to see a close fit between
family life-at least in its ideal form-and a different conception of liberal
equality, which emphasizes the worth of the individual and the
development of her capacity to select and to live a life of her own choosing,
meaning a way of life that deploys her talents to pursue her values.
In an ideal setting, the family provides a degree of intimacy, partiality,
and diversity that a standardized, communal system cannot. One of the few
cross-cultural developmental findings is that children require lasting, close
relationships with a small group of adults.64 These adults might be
64. See. e.g., JEFFREY TRAWICK-SMITH, EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 174-81 (2000)
(noting some cultural differences in the reactions of parents and infants to specific situations, but
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organized into families-or into kibbutzim or other communes-but the
critical attribute is that emotional and intellectual development requires
secure and long-term attachment to particular caregivers.
These attachments, characterized by long-term persistence and
intimacy, cannot meet the criterion of sameness. The adults to whom
children are attached cannot offer a standardized environment or a setting
that develops all possible talents for which a child might have some genetic
aptitude. Whether the adults love music or sports, art or food or religion,
they will inevitably expose their children to certain tastes and ways of life
that will preclude time and attention devoted to others. The differences
among adults form part of the particularity of the emotional relationship
between parent and child: this person loves me.
Blustein puts it this way: the human "capacity for deep personal
relationships depends on early childhood experiences," and in particular,
the experience of the lasting and partisan love that a parent offers to her
child.65 The love of a parent for a child, and the persistence of the
individual parent over time, demonstrates to that child her importance in
the world and her singularity as an individual. A parent sees her child in a
way that no other person does. In that child's eyes, she sees the baby that
was and the adult that will be, and she offers an unconditional commitment.
The child experiences intimacy and recognition; she understands herself
(eventually) to be separate from the parent and uniquely worthy of love.
Over time, the child ideally develops a sense of her parents (and others) as
unique and worthy in themselves. Parent-child love serves as the child's
first model, and in some respects the lasting model, for adult relationships
and a sense of responsibility toward others.
The parent-child relationship also serves to give the child deep
experience with one way of life and helps locate the child in a community
or culture. Recall Ackerman's theory, in which the family satisfies
children's "need for cultural coherence"-providing a thick form of
cultural identity which serves as the starting point for children's
exploration of other life options.66 Cultural coherence adds to the child's
sense of herself as an individual with a unique identity: I come from X and
have chosen X or Y. Cultural coherence also serves an educational function
by providing children with firsthand experience of whatever version of a
suggesting that "responsiveness and warmth are important caregiving behaviors in all cultures,
[although] how they are expressed varies greatly").
65. BLUSTElN, supra note 13, at 219.
66. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 140-43.
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committed life their parents have chosen. Children encounter the pleasures
and limitations of one particular way of life and can build on that
experience as they begin to branch out to consider what other ways of life
might be preferable.67
The suggestion, then, is that family life uniquely contributes to at least
one conception of liberal equality by fostering personal characteristics-
including a sense of individual identity (fostered by the emotional intimacy
and continuity of parental care) and the capacity to choose among diverse
ways of life.
V. WHAT LEGAL REFORMS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO
IMPLEMENT EQUALITY FOR CHILDREN?
The insight that the family plays a constructive role in child
development does not resolve the conflict between equality and family life.
Families that foster necessary qualities in children may reproduce
inequalities as well. Even in ideal theory, families may differ in class status
or in parental competence.
For example, consider class differences. As we have seen, in modern
capitalist societies, class background correlates with children's life options.
Children reared by middle-class families are more likely to remain in the
middle class as adults than to fall in the social spectrum, while children
reared in poorer households are likely to remain in poorer households as
adults.68 Growing up in a middle-class household today means that one is
more likely than others to inherit financial wealth, a social network that
confers economic options, and even personal traits (a sense of entitlement
and ease with authority)69 that may translate into management skills and
ease entry into the professional world. True, individuals may reject or be
unable to make use of their class capital. Dalton Conley, for example, has
documented the substantial inequality experienced by siblings within
families in every economic class. 7o But on average, growing up in a
67. Other theorists also see affirmative value in exposing children to their parents' way of life.
David Archard ventures a step further, positing that membership (in a cultural tradition) may be a good
in the Rawlsian sense, something that ought to be fairly and universally distributed. Membership, in
Archard's view, provides a child with a "firm and secure sense of her identity." Archard, supra note 51,
at 158. Robert Noggle approves the family's role as providing a "default" value system for children,
which a child can later choose to accept, reject, or modify. Robert Noggle, Special Agents: Children's
Autonomy and Parental Authority, in THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra note
48, at 97, 110-15.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
69. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
70. DALTON CONLEY, THE PECKING ORDER: A BOLD NEW LOOK AT How FAMILY AND SOCIETY
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middle-class family represents an advantage if one takes access to eventual
middle-class status to be an option that is valuable to many and can be
discarded if one wishes.
The rejoinder, once again, is clear enough in principle, though likely
to meet significant resistance in practice. Radical changes could-in
principle-disrupt present class hierarchies. The critical point is that the
villain in the story is not the family but the institutions that preserve class
hierarchy and permit family class status to determine one's life options. A
liberal society might attempt to promote a high degree of economic and
social mobility so that class background would become a cultural artifact
rather than a determinant of one's place in the hierarchy.
What would a program of this type look like? Once again, in theory,
one can imagine its contours. For instance, a society might abolish
inherited wealth and provide for each child to have good housing,
nutritious food, and good health care, without regard to her family's cash
position. A system of equal liberal education might, in principle, cultivate
each child's academic potential as well as her talents via extracurricular
activities. These schools would (again, in principle) help every child
explore different ways of life and would introduce children to adults
working in jobs and pursuits of interest to ensure that each child entered
adult life with a social network. Such a society might also provide, in lieu
of private inheritance, a financial stake or a basic income sufficient to give
each young adult substantial independence in deciding where and with
whom to live, and what financial and other projects to pursue.7l
The unifying idea behind such reforms would be to diminish the
impact of childhood class differences on adult opportunities. Mediating
institutions like inheritance taxation, reformed public education, and
stakeholding might mitigate financial differences and permit society to
achieve the ideal of undominated diversity. Richer parents could still buy
more extravagant houses or expensive lessons, to be sure, but (remain in
theory for now!) all children would have good housing and extracurricular
pursuits to school their own talents. Further, every parent, having been
reared themselves in such a society, would have a story to tell about their
own lives, and in such a society-even more so than today-many might
disdain the kinds of lives necessary to gain riches.
Remaining in ideal theory for the moment, it would still be the case
DETERMINE WHO WE BECOME (2005).
71. See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 11, at 4-5; Alstott, Equal Opportunity, supra note
11, at 489-96.
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that richer or better-educated parents might open doors for their children
that poorer or less-educated parents could not. But a neutralist liberal state
would deny that such options are better than the alternative. Some readers
of this Article (and indeed its author) may have difficulty setting aside the
firm belief that the children of intellectuals have access to the best of all
possible worlds-the world of ideas. But other adults might-and do-
reject that view. They might insist just as sincerely that the godly life or the
life of an athlete is the better road. Indeed, they might pity the children of
the pointy-headed intellectual, whose family spends too much time indoors
with their books and too little time pondering the will of God or practicing
their basketball skills.
Complex equality for children thus rests on a particular interpretation
of liberal neutrality: provided that every child receives equal material
resources and a sound family upbringing, the criterion of undominated
diversity is met. No one could complain that they were unfairly denied jet-
set parents, intellectual parents, sporty parents, or God-fearing parents.
Children may, when grown, embrace their parents' way of life or reject it.
But in either case, the child has gained the experience of a committed life,
and she can judge her own projects by their relationship to the life she lived
with her family.
The critical move here, of course, is the assertion that the demands of
equality are met if material equality and liberal schools produce children
with capabilities sufficient to meet the criterion of undominated diversity.
Undominated diversity has been controversial, reflecting the schism within
liberalism between those who endorse "talent-pooling" and those who
oppose it. 72 My point is not at all that one should accept undominated
diversity-that argument would take quite another form. My point, instead,
is that ifone takes that road, certain conclusions about the family and child
development follow logically.73 (In Part VII.A, I consider the implications
if one rejects undominated diversity.)
Even so, as soon as one constructs such an ideal, politics and
administrative practicalities suggest objections. For instance, an egalitarian
society might remain a market economy, but it would require
controversially high levels of taxes. While one might debate the economic
72. For background on talent pooling, see Anthony T. Kronman, Talent Pooling, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: NOMOS XXIII, at 58 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1981), and the discussion
of the talent-pooling debate in Alstott, Equal Opportunity, supra note II, at 479-85.
73. Interestingly, Fishkin's analysis adopts a version of resource equality without talent-pooling.
FISHKIN, supra note 6, at 34-35. He does point out that incorporating talent pooling would make the
task of equalization even more strenuous. Id. at 35.
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effects of high taxation, the objection is difficult to answer definitively,
given existing empirical evidence,74 and the high political salience of tax
levels suggests further difficulties in getting from here to there.
Stakeholding, likewise, would be controversial even without the other
measures. Universal preschool and school reform have proved difficult for
complex reasons, and the dramatic inequalities of public schools today
remain a sore spot for any egalitarian agenda.
One might also object that real-world parents are not all uniformly
competent. What about children whose parents are disinclined or unable to
provide the emotional care and cultural context that the liberal ideal
imagines? In principle, an egalitarian state might adopt two measures to
address that possibility. Ex ante, the state might, as Hugh LaFollette has
proposed, screen parents in advance, denying to the incompetent, the
negligent, and the troubled the opportunity to be parents. 75 It might also, ex
post, offer material assistance and expert aid to enable parents to perform
competently, with the ideal being that every child should have a family
capable of performing its emotional and moral functions. For instance, the
state might subsidize paid family leave for childbirth, and children's and
parents' illnesses in order to improve care in some families. Improved
access to rehabilitation services for drug and alcohol addicts, with intensive
follow-up care, could also address one of the most common sources of
parental failure. Additional services might be offered to support parents or
children with disabilities.76 At the same time, state funding for children's
shelter, food, clothing, and health care could nearly eliminate neglect that is
due to parental poverty (rather than to parents' physical or psychological
inability to care for their child).
The LaFollette proposal remains controversial (to put it extremely
mildly). Denying some the right to become parents would tread on
constitutional guarantees to freedom of procreation and could evoke the
practices of totalitarian regimes. The specter of racial and class inequality
would be ever present, as would the possibilities for state corruption.
But an egalitarian liberal society need not adopt that approach to
address the problem of differentials in parental abilities. In principle, the
family ought to be understood as an institution for child rearing that is
located alongside, and deeply entwined with, redistributive programs and a
74. See Alstott, Equal Opportunity, supra note II, at 496-501.
75. See Hugh LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 182 (1980) (advocating the
licensing of parents). See also DWYER, supra note 10, at 254-58 (outlining legal rules that would screen
for parental incompetence).
76. See ALSTOTT, No EXIT, supra note II, at 117-37.
2008] IS THE FAMILY AT ODDS WITH EQUALITY? 29
reformed educational system, as well as an extensive system of family
support services. This kind of program would be inherently controversial,
politically difficult, and administratively challenging, of course, and it
would require a degree of regulation and state competence that many may
find implausible. And yet, in principle, it could be achieved.
After a brief summary and extension of the argument in Part VI, Part
VII outlines the significant revisions in constitutional and state law
governing parents' rights and state responsibilities that would be needed to
implement an egalitarian approach.
VI. HOW WOULD AN EGALITARIAN LEGAL REGIME INTERPRET
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE STATE'S AFFIRMATIVE
OBLIGATIONS?
Begin with an empirical question: would parents object to the kind of
egalitarian programs I have described to this point? After all, this account
of family would accommodate a wide range of family structures and ways
of life. The two functions of the family-emotional and intellectual growth
via continuity of care, and moral instruction and cultural context-eould be
accomplished in a variety of ways. Within wide boundaries, parental efforts
should be acceptable in such a regime. Further, if such a program were
practically and politically feasible, it would support family life by
guaranteeing each child equal material entitlements, a good education, and
it would even expand family supports like paid leave. Some parents would
object to the higher taxes they faced, but others would suffer fewer
financial worries.
Still, even a liberal program would rule some parental choices out of
bounds, and those parents might object that their freedom has been
curtailed. A parent might object to liberal education, for example, if she
does not wish her child to encounter alternatives to her family's way of life.
This is the familiar case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which Amish families
challenged a state statute requiring children to attend high school.77
Another set of parents might object to the standards of care for children set
by the egalitarian state. They might prefer prayer healing to conventional
medicine,78 or they might wish to cut off their children's relationship with
grandparents, as in Troxel v. Granville.79
77. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
78. E.g., Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
79. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-61 (2000).
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Present law has resolved such disputes in parents' favor on various
grounds: Yoder rests on (probably outdated) Free Exercise grounds, but
also on (probably still viable) parental autonomy principles.80 Hermanson
v. State rests on Due Process principles,81 while Troxel invokes parental
freedom and authority in invalidating a statute that permitted nonparents to
seek visitation with children. 82
Present law's deference to parental authority coexists with the doctrine
that the state has few, if any, affirmative obligations to children. The
Supreme Court has construed the federal Constitution, for example, to
confer no right to welfare or even to protection from harm.83 The canonical
case is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
which held that the state had no obligation to keep four-year-old Joshua
DeShaney safe from his abusive father, even though the child had been
flagged repeatedly as an abuse victim, and the state had been ineffectual in
its efforts to address the situation. 84 The dissent offered the famous lament,
"Poor Joshua!,"85 but the majority declined to find any constitutional right
to state protection for the boy whose father had beaten him nearly to
death.86
All these doctrines and more would require new scrutiny in an
egalitarian liberal regime. Limits on parental "horticulture" could call into
question the results in Yoder and Troxel, as well as the results in other cases
permitting parents to send children to private schools, to home-school
them, and to deny them medical care.87 And, contrary to DeShaney, an
egalitarian state surely would owe affirmative obligations to children.
According to the analysis above, these obligations would include equal
material provision and a family capable of providing nurture and cultural
80. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-15. See also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82
(1990) (upholding against a Free Exercise challenge a law denying unemployment benefits to those
fired for drug use during areligious ceremony, but pointing out in dicta that the Yoder holding rested, in
addition, on a substantive due process rationale).
81. Hermanson, 604 So. 2d. at 776. But see Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988)
(rejecting a parent's Free Exercise defense to a criminal prosecution for failure to obtain medical care
for achild who died).
82. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-67.
83. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,201-02 (1989).
84. Id. at 191-93,202.
85. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 201-02 (majority opinion).
87. See. e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding a right to private
education). Cf Guardianship of Phillip 8., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1983) (awarding guardianship
of child to nonparents, but warning that the rationale was the parents' "emotional abandonment" of their
son with Down's Syndrome, not their institutionalization of him).
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coherence.88
Put another way, present doctrine sidesteps many hard problems in
child development. A liberal egalitarian regime could address the parental
liberty objection, but in doing so would raise a host of new questions. In
this part, I begin with a short theoretical sketch of parental liberty in an
egalitarian regime, and I then consider how such a regime might revisit
each of these four hard cases.
The basic idea is that a liberal egalitarian state would understand
parental freedom as properly constrained by parental obligation. Thus, a
parent could not object that a state requirement (say, to obtain medical
care) infringed her freedom, because the proper scope of parental freedom
would be circumscribed by the collective obligation to the child.
To see the point, begin with adult-to-adult interactions. Suppose that
A sincerely believes in a vision of the good that mandates harming B. A
liberal egalitarian society would prohibit A from abusing B, and would not
consider A's freedom to be infringed by the prohibition. A could not
complain that the state had prevented her from doing something she had a
right to do, because the moral equality of persons implies that harming
other individuals is not a legitimate exercise of one's freedom. 89 B is a
person in her own right, and not simply an instrument to A's ends. Thus, it
is uncontroversial that laws forbidding homicide help determine the
legitimate scope of freedom; we do not say that there is a "fundamental
conflict" between liberty and crime prevention.
In an egalitarian liberal society, the state would assume an obligation
to ensure that each child arrived at adulthood with the capabilities needed
to make and carry out a life plan. Liberal equality thus would impose an
obligation on all adults to provide fair institutions for child development.
When adults became parents, they would take on additional obligations to
their child-to provide continuity of care and cultural coherence-and to
refrain from interfering with the child's access to the liberal education and
material resources provided by the state. These obligations would
(properly) circumscribe adult liberty, just as the murder laws do.
What is the source of the collective obligation to equality for children?
In prior work, I have suggested that the Rawlsian original position would
produce a collective commitment to developmental conditions that would
88. See supra Parts III-IV.
89. The harm principle is associated with John Stuart Mill and has been elaborated by others. For
a brief explanation, see David Brink, Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., Fall 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/faI12008/entries/mill-moral-political.
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permit every child to develop the capabilities that underlie autonomy-
including a parental obligation to provide continuity of care.90 Some
theorists deploy principles of equality to the same result. Ackerman's ideal
of dialogic equality ("I am just as good as you") leads him to reject parental
"horticulture"-that is, the claim that parents ought to control fully their
children's developmental conditions. 91 Parents, he suggests, must not stand
in the role of "master gardeners" who can treat their children as they
choose.92 Instead, parents should be expected to help foster children's
development (in part, by cooperating in state efforts to expand children's
horizons).93 Blustein invokes (among other ideals) the Kantian principle
that human beings should be treated as ends rather than means to justify a
child-centered theory which emphasizes parents' duty to develop children's
autonomy and prepare them to participate in a just society.94
But translating these principles into law would require a 180-degree
tum in constitutional and state law conceptions of the parental role and the
role of the state. Consider Wisconsin v. Yoder, the 1972 case pitting a
Wisconsin law mandating school attendance to age sixteen against the
objections of Old Order Amish parents (including the Yoders).95 The
Yoders did not wish their children to attend high school. They cited the
need for children to work on the farm as well as the harm done to their
religious values by secular education and mixing with children from other
backgrounds.96 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Yoders.97
Yoder is a classic taught in both constitutional law and family law
courses.98 While the Free Exercise rationale for the Yoder decision has
been eliminated by later case law, the parental-liberty rationale remains in
place.99 Particularly important in the present context is the understanding of
parental liberty revealed by the Justices in the majority opinion: "[T]his
90. ALSTOTT, No EXIT, supra note 11, at 36-41,56-58.
91. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 139.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 139, 143-46.
94. BLUSTEIN, supra note 13, at 120-36.
95. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207 (1972).
96. Id. at 210-11.
97. Id. at 234.
98. For additional cases establishing parental rights over children's education, see Pierce v.
Society ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding a right to send children to private school), and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overruling conviction of teacher for instructing child in a foreign
language with the parents' permission).
99. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (upholding against a Free
Exercise challenge a law denying unemployment benefits to those fired for drug use during a religious
ceremony, but pointing out in dicta that the Yoder holding rested, in addition, on a substantive due
process rationale).
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case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of
the State, to guide the religious future and education of their
children.... This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition."loo
Liberal critics of Yoder have pointed out the detriment to the Amish
children inherent in the Court's decision. IOI A high school education would
have expanded the children's options outside the Amish community and
would have given them the chance to interact with other cultural and moral
communities and to envision themselves taking part in a different
tradition. 102 These are, of course, precisely the experiences that the Yoder
parents wished to avoid. 103 Yoder is thus typically framed as a conflict
between parental liberty and children's prospects for equality as adults. l04
Faced with a liberty-equality conflict, the Supreme Court opted to endorse
parental liberty. 105
How might a case like Yoder be analyzed under liberal egalitarian
principles, which reject parental "horticulture"? In such a regime, the
Yoders would not be entitled to oppose liberal education or to reject
exposure to ways of life other than their own. Since a liberal regime would
treat education and experience beyond the family as part of the state's
collective obligation to each child, such a claim would violate the Yoder's
responsibilities as parents, and denying their claim would not infringe their
liberty; it would simply enforce their obligations as parents.
Still, adjudicating such cases would be no simple matter, even if it
were politically palatable to deny parental "horticulture" claims. The ideal
of complex equality suggests that the family's role in child development
deserves respect. While the Yoder parents should not be permitted to
terminate their children's education early, the state for its part should be
obliged to engage with the parents to work out an educational solution that
would treat the children and culture respectfully while also exposing the
children to life options outside the Amish community.
Put another way, the abandonment of parental liberty as the (easy)
criterion for decision would put the courts into the soup of deciding what
100. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
101. See Richard Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A
Critique ofWisconsin v. Yoder, in DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 137, 158-59 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1996).
102. See id. at 147.
103. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210-11.
104. See, e.g., Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 149-52, 172-73.
lOS. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
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was developmentally best for the Yoder children, but this is not necessarily
a straightforward determination. Adolescence is a turbulent time, and the
Yoders might have been concerned that simply dumping their children into
a large, secular high school would leave the children confused and
vulnerable. Teachers unfamiliar with Amish ways might treat the Amish
children badly or discount their abilities due to language differences. Peers
might bully them, taking advantage of their unfamiliarity with secular
culture. Framed this way, the Yoder parents might legitimately challenge
the state to provide a truly liberal education-one that arranges a sensitive
and successful transition from children's early immersion in family culture
to their later exposure to alternative ways of life.
One clear implication is that the doctrine of parental liberty currently
has the side-effect of excusing the state from taking active responsibility in
child development. It follows that abandoning the strong view of parental
liberty would put the state-and the courts-to the task of evaluating
institutions based on criteria of what is best for children. And this can be a
contentious and unsettled matter, to put it mildly.
Put more concretely, the Yoder Court (and subsequent commentators)
have framed the case as a hard-edged conflict between religious belief and
the equality objectives of the state. 106 The Yoders appear as pressing an
absolutist claim for religious freedom and parental liberty, while the state
takes the absolutist position that the parents should face criminal penalties
for violating the school-attendance laws. 107 Evaluating the case according
to liberal egalitarian standards would require the state to look beyond the
liberty-equality conflict and ask what arrangements would have best served
the Amish children during the developmental transition from family life to
liberal citizenship.
One might imagine very different views on such a question. For
instance, it is not obvious that an egalitarian state should place the Amish
children into large regional high schools, at least without transition and
support mechanisms. There are a range of institutional options that might
work, but many of them might require some accommodation for the
children. The children might, for instance, benefit from transitional
assistance, smaller schools-within-schools, neighborhood schools, or other
planning options. The ideal would be to integrate children's need for
106. See id. at 213-15; Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 146-49, 152-53.
107. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207--09. While the parents were fined only $5 each, the statute
permitted the imposition of up to three-month jail sentences. Id. at 207 n.2. According to the opinion,
the state rejected out of hand an offer by the Amish to negotiate an alternative arrangement. Id. at 208
n.3.
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cultural context in a family setting with their need for a gradually more
challenging and diverse educational setting.
An approach of this kind raises a number of thorny constitutional
issues. The Free Exercise holding in Yoder is probably obsolete under
present doctrine, which holds that a generally applicable rule that does not
discriminate against religious practice is valid. lOS Still, the issue of
religiously motivated parental (mis)conduct is a thorny one in principle for
a liberal regime, because the function of the family is thought to be parents'
transmission of deep commitments to their children. When the state acts to
limit parents' capacity to act on those commitments, even in the cause of
protecting children, there is at least a potential conflict within the liberal
ideal, as one function of the family (cultural coherence) conflicts with
another (providing adequate nurture).
And there are still more difficult issues. Would accommodations for
Amish (or other religious) children raise Establishment Clause issues?
What level of government should administer the child development
criterion: Should children's entitlement (or, correspondingly, the state's
obligation) be constitutionalized and subject to judicial review? Should it
instead be left to legislatures or school districts, perhaps with a mandate for
judicial deference? And so on.
The point is not that such reengineering of state commitments is
impossible, but simply that weakening the doctrine of parental rights would
raise new questions that fall outside the U.S. constitutional tradition. Put
another way, if the law were to expand the permissible scope for the
regulation of family life, it would have to adopt new standards for
determining what kind of regulations ought to be approved.
Troxel, a 2000 case, illustrates the challenges that would accompany a
weakening of the doctrine of parental liberty.109 In Troxel, the grandparents
of two little girls petitioned for visitation rights, invoking a Washington
State statute granting "[a]ny person" the right to petition for visitation with
a child. IIO The Troxel grandparents sought to maintain contact with the
children after their son (the children's father) committed suicide. I I I The
children visited them regularly at first, but the children's mother, Tommie
Granville, remarried and later wished to cut back on visitation. 112 Her
108. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
109. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,65-66 (2000).
110. [d. at 60-61.
Ill. [d.
112. [d.
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reasons for opposing extended visits are not explored in the case; as far as a
reader can tell, there was no question of abuse or neglect by the Troxels.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Troxels based on the "best interests"
standard in the statute. 113 The grandparents apparently offered "cousins and
music" and a counterbalance to the stepfamily formed by Granville and her
new husband, where there were six children in addition to the two girls. I14
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Granville, striking down the state
statute as incompatible with the substantive due process liberty rights
granted to parents under the Court's prior decisions. I 15 The Court criticized
the Washington statute's broad grant of authority to the courts to decide
visitation questions based on the child's best interests, with no special
weight given to the parent's views. I16 Troxel thus exemplifies the primacy
of parental liberty in present U.S. constitutional doctrine.
How might the legal inquiry differ if the standard were framed by
reference to the functions of the family, as developed in Part IV?I17 Recall
that families serve two functions: they provide continuity of care, and they
foster moral development and cultural identity. The question, then, would
be whether visitation for children with particular adults serves these
functions or undermines them. Put another way, which people should be
involved in a child's life, and on what terms?
The difficulty, of course, is that the criterion of child development
might suggest very different answers, depending on the facts and on the
theory of development one adopts. A relationship with grandparents over a
parent's objection, for example, may look very different depending on the
child's stage of development. A young child might be confused and
worried about a visit with grandparents that angers her mother. By contrast,
an adolescent might value the chance to explore his identity beyond the
nuclear family and could better tolerate a parent's emotional reaction.
Although some theories offer clear-cut prescriptions, the theories
themselves are controversial. For instance, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud,
113. /d. at 61-62.
114. /d.
lIS. See id. at 65-67 (noting that "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court").
116. /d. at 67.
117. Justice Stevens suggests that the child's interests should be considered, but he seems to
understand the child's right as primarily a liberty interest in associating with her grandparents; he does
not explore the equality dimension of a child's developmental conditions. See id. at 88-90 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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and Albert Solnit prefer legal rules that (in contested cases) vest complete
authority over the child in one parent to the exclusion of all others,
including the other parent.I 18 On such a view, one might endorse Troxel as
appropriately consolidating authority in the mother's hands. 119 But their
view privileges one function of the family (continuity of care) over others
(moral identity and cultural development).
I will not attempt here to examine how these elements might be
weighed when they come into conflict. My point, instead, is simply that a
legal analysis motivated by the ideal of complex equality would raise new
questions and may be more complicated and difficult than an analysis
motivated by a libertarian ideal of parental freedom.
Revisiting DeShaney invites further elaboration on the same theme.
The facts in the case are horrendous. Joshua came to the attention of the
local social services department after being treated, several times, in the
emergency room for suspicious injuries. 12o Social services workers found
insufficient evidence of abuse to remove Joshua from the home for more
than a temporary period, so they returned him to the home and prescribed
certain interventions (counseling for the father, preschool for the child, and
encouraging a girlfriend to leave the home). The state failed to act even
when Joshua continued to suffer suspicious injuries and when the family
failed to implement the recommended changes. 121
Ultimately, Joshua's father beat him so severely that he suffered brain
damage severe enough to require lifelong institutionalization. 122 Despite
Justice Blackmun's famous dissent lamenting "Poor Joshua! ,"123 the
Supreme Court majority held that the state had no affirmative duty to
protect Joshua. 124
What if DeShaney had come out the other way? Once again, the
questions are not impossible to resolve, but they would be novel within the
U.S. constitutional tradition. How extensive would the state's obligation to
protect children be? What should be the standard of care imposed on the
118. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 53, at 116-19.
119. Cf Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SuP.
CT. REV. 279, 284 (noting that a variety of child-centered theories might endorse strong parental rights
on instrumental grounds, and arguing that children are best served by constitutional protections for
parents). Buss contends that Troxel attempts to walk an untenable middle line, asserting protection for
parental rights while inviting future legislatures to infringe those rights. ld. at 285-86.
120. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1989).
121. ld.
122. ld. at 193.
123. ld. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. ld. at 201-02 (majority opinion).
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state? What if parents interfered with state efforts? And, once again, there
are structural and separation-of-powers issues: Should the state's obligation
to children be made a matter of constitutional law rather than left up to the
Congress and state legislatures? What should be the standard for judicial
review? Should judges defer to the executive? And to what degree could or
should judges be authorized to force the state to spend money in order to
implement its affirmative obligation?125
VII. MOVING PIECES: HOW ALTERNATIVE LIBERAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, FAMILY LIFE,
AND PARENTAL AUTONOMY RE-CREATE THE DILEMMA
Liberal egalitarian theories are not, of course, monolithic. Theorists
differ on important matters including the nature of equality, the nature and
significance of differentials in abilities, and the role of the family in a
liberal state. To this point, I have highlighted just one set of plausible
liberal commitments in order to show that family life and equal opportunity
are not necessarily incompatible.
But the dilemma begins to recur if one adopts any of several
alternative interpretations of key liberal values. The following discussion
renders the argument in the preceding parts more transparent by
summarizing its key moves. In addition, it broadens the earlier analysis to
show how the liberal dilemma returns-and what form it takes-if one
adopts alternative interpretations of three liberal ideals.
A. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND UNEQUAL TALENTS
The discussion in Part III adopts Ackerman's principle of
undominated diversity to determine what kinds of abilities a human being
needs to be able to participate fully in the liberal community. Ackerman
offers undominated diversity to answer the question whether any citizens
merit compensation from the collective when they find themselves
endowed with different abilities. In essence, his question is when do
differentials in the distributions of talents rise to the level of (compensable)
disabilities. I adapt his theory to answer the different but related question of
125. Some of these issues have been discussed in legal scholarship commenting on DeShaney.
See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990); Jack M.
Beerman, Essay, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics ojDeShaney, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1078; Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" oj DeShaney, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1513 (1989). For another view, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse
as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (invoking
the Thirteenth Amendment as grounds for ruling in favor of Joshua DeShaney).
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what baseline level of abilities a liberal state ought to aspire to guarantee to
children.
As I noted, however, undominated diversity remains one of several
different approaches to the question of disability; even those writing in the
resource-egalitarian or luck-egalitarian traditions take different positions on
the nature of disability. Philippe Van Parijs, for instance, adopts
undominated diversity.126 But Rawls and Dworkin adopt the view that
inequalities in the distribution of talents should (to some degree) alter the
distribution of resources among individuals. 127
The debate between those egalitarians who reject talent pooling l28 and
those who endorse it is a deep and ongoing one, and I will not attempt
either to summarize it here or to engage in a substantive argument for
undominated diversity as against alternative views. 129 Instead, I want to
point out the relationship between one's position on talent differentials and
the nature of the liberal dilemma. Imagine that there is a spectrum of views,
with undominated diversity at one end and complete talent pooling at the
other. That is, one polar view is that wide differentials in abilities are
compatible with equality, while the opposite view is that even minute
differentials in abilities require compensation and redistribution (compared
to a baseline of equal distribution).
The theory of undominated diversity, adapted for children, helps
resolve the conflict between parental autonomy and equal opportunity by
endorsing a very wide range of developmental conditions for children. Put
another way, if children need only step up at adulthood with relatively
minimal capabilities, then it follows that society can tolerate a high degree
of parental autonomy in setting developmental conditions.
A more demanding conception of capabilities would tend to re-create
the liberal dilemma in its classic form. Suppose, for example, that
inequalities in adults' musical or athletic talents were considered
compensable disabilities and suppose, moreover, that compensation is
never perfect: the untalented might enjoy greater dollars or perhaps
subsidized theater tickets or the like, but they could never be endowed with
126. VAN PARIJS, supra note 7, at 72-76.
127. For a summary, see the discussion in Alstott, Equal Opportunity, supra note II, at 479-85.
128. For an article adopting that term and criticizing efforts to compensate for differential talents,
see Kronman, supra note 72.
129. For a critical discussion of Ackerman's undominated diversity idea, see MARK S. STEIN,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY 158-79 (2006). For a critical discussion of Dworkin's theory,
see VAN PARIJS, supra note 7, at 68-72. And for a criticism of a wide spectrum of egalitarian views, see
Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point ofEquality? 109 ETHICS 287, 302-07 (1999).
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the actual talent they are lacking. On this view, it seems that the liberal
dilemma recurs: because talent differentials represent inequality of
opportunity, and because compensation is in principle inadequate, it would
seem that society must either adopt standardized, communal child rearing
(perhaps combined with intensive remediation to attack talent differentials
early on), or else acknowledge that equality is unachievable.
There are, of course, middle grounds between pure undominated
diversity and complete talent pooling. Still, the vector of the argument
should be clear: the higher our standards for the capabilities people need to
be equal to one another, the smaller the likelihood that a diverse range of
parents can meet the standard while also exercising significant personal
control over the developmental environment.
Another way to conceptualize the spectrum of views and their
consequences is to acknowledge that the strand of resource egalitarianism
on which I draw in this Article is more libertarian and less egalitarian than
some other egalitarian liberal theories. A true libertarian theory faces no
dilemma at all when it comes to the family, because it does not demand that
children step up to adulthood with any particular set of capabilities at all.
Because freedom lies primarily in self-ownership, then adults are equal
even if they were reared in tremendously unequal material circumstances
and even if they display enormous variability in their capacity to choose
among visions of the goOd. 130
The version of resource-equality liberalism I adopted in the preceding
parts certainly demands more equality than the libertarian view. For
instance, it requires equality in the ex ante division of material resources, a
family functional enough to impart emotional and moral capacities, and a
liberal education intended to foster tolerance and capacities for choice. And
yet, the theory of undominated diversity occupies a space closer to the
libertarian view than talent-pooling theories do.
B. THE TASKS OF THE FAMILY
The analysis of the liberal dilemma offered in the preceding parts also
incorporates a theory of the family that makes limited demands on parents.
The discussion in Part IV suggests that families should provide continuity
of care and should demonstrate to children a commitment to some way of
life. But the discussion is careful to add the caveat that commitment must
130. For a critical discussion of self-ownership in libertarian theories, see Barbara Fried, Left-
Libertarianism: A Review Essay, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 67-68 (2004).
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be understood in a neutralist rather than perfectionist sense.
On this view, then, the liberal family serves its functions if parents
remain with their children for the long term and include them in the
parents' way of life. This view avoids the conflict between parental liberty
and children's equality by preserving a wide space for parents to choose
their own way of life, provided only that parents refrain from interfering
with children's access to the material resources and liberal education
provided by the state.
But one implication of the view adopted in this Article is that the
system of liberal education must do a great deal of heavy lifting in
developing children's capabilities: it must not only provide basic education,
but must also help develop the habits of tolerance and participation
necessary for liberal citizenship. The education system must also, on this
view, exert considerable effort to expose children to alternative ways of
life.
This view of the family is plausible and well represented in the liberal
literature on the subject. Still, there are alternative conceptions of the
family that would be consonant with liberal ideals, but have different
implications for the liberal dilemma. A more demanding notion of the
family would tend to lessen pressure on the education system-at the cost
of re-creating the conflict between parental liberty and equal opportunity
for children. For example, still operating within the liberal tradition, some
theorists suggest that the family ought to be a first school for citizenship,
and that families ought to inculcate in children particular values, including,
perhaps, respect for authority, tolerance, and equality between the sexes. 131
Raising the bar for families, however, tends to re-create the liberal
dilemma, because it increases the number of parents who cannot (or will
not) meet these standards. Unless the "school for citizenship" criterion is
either meaningless or can be remediated completely by the liberal
education system, then some X number of families will be unable or
unwilling to perform that function. By implication, those families either
must give up their children or be subject to interventions that alter family
life in ways contrary to parents' wishes.
131. See the thoughtful discussion in LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 50--84 (2006)
(recognizing the conflict between parental autonomy and the ideal of families as "seedbeds of civic
virtue").
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The third moving piece in my effort to resolve the liberal dilemma is
the interpretation of parental autonomy. In Part VI, I reject the
interpretation of parental autonomy as whatever parents might wish to do.
Instead, I argue that the scope of parental autonomy is justifiably
circumscribed by parental obligations to provide continuity of care and
cultural coherence, and to permit the child to partake of the liberal
education and material resources provided by the state. There, I suggest
that, just as the law requires citizens to choose ways of life that do not
involve harm to others or a denial of equal respect, so too the law should
require parents to exercise their autonomy within the constraints of parental
obligation.
This move, however, may be relatively palatable because the
argument here also sets a relatively low bar for parental duty: since parents
are largely free to do what they want, the legal constraints I endorse would
not drastically restrict, for most parents, the lives they wish to lead.
Certainly, some parents might find their wishes at odds with the law, as the
discussion in Part VI suggests: the Yoders, the Hermansons, even the
Troxels might find themselves engaged with the state in a dialogue about
child development, and with outcomes that constrain the lives they would
like to lead. But because my argument adopts undominated diversity and
requires families only to provide continuous care and cultural coherence,
many parents would be able to continue to act just as they now do.
But it is worth noting that the argument I make about parental
obligation constraining parental freedom could in principle reduce parental
autonomy (relative to the baseline of what parents now do) far more
significantly. To take an extreme case, suppose that the analysis in Part IV
had concluded that children in a liberal state must be reared in institutions,
or must be shipped off to new families periodically to ensure their exposure
to several different ways of life. Many people would be horrified and
would say that such measures infringe parental autonomy. What, precisely,
they would mean by "parental autonomy" would require further analysis.
One interpretation would be "the right to do anything they wish," but
another might be (for instance) "the right to conduct a lasting relationship
with children built on a foundation of care and mutual respect."
But the form of the argument I make does not depend even on the
latter, more nuanced interpretation. The principle of parental obligation I
offer in effect gives absolute priority to the children's developmental needs
over any claim about parental autonomy. Put another way, if one adopts the
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priority rule I suggest, there is no liberal dilemma at all: there cannot be a
conflict between parental autonomy and children's equality if parental
autonomy occupies only the residual space left after the institutions
necessary for children's equality needs are created.
The point, then, is this: these controversial moves go down rather
palatably in my argument because they are combined with additional
moves that leave quite a wide space for diverse and nonconformist
families. But there remains a live issue for liberals whether parental
autonomy ought to be a residual-occupying the space bounded by
parental obligation-or whether instead there ought to be some absolute
core of parental autonomy that ought not to be infringed by the state.
If one is inclined toward the latter view, then the liberal dilemma may
or may not recur, depending on the interpretations of equal opportunity and
family tasks one adopts. The vectors should, by this point, be clear: the
greater the capabilities every child must have, the greater the expectations
one has of the family for creating those capabilities, and the more
expansive the interpretation of parental autonomy, the more likely it is that
the dilemma will recur.
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